David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 52 (3):232-254 (2009)
This essay argues that non-linguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality (maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasons - provided that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental states - and they can deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that animals are capable only of (mechanical) behaviour, not of (intentional) action
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References found in this work BETA
Jose Luis Bermudez (2006). Animal Reasoning and Proto-Logic. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
Robert Brandom (2010). Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice. Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):13-35.
Jonathan Dancy (2002). Practical Reality. Oxford University Press.
David DeGrazia (1996). Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Can Animals Judge? Dialectica 64 (1):11-33.
Hans-Johann Glock (2012). The Anthropological Difference: What Can Philosophers Do To Identify the Differences Between Human and Non-Human Animals? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:105-131.
James Barham (2012). Normativity, Agency, and Life. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):92-103.
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