Mind, matter, and monad

Mind and Matter 5 (2):201-214 (2007)
The indiscernability of the waking life and well-developed in- stances of the dream life suggests that the world perceived during waking is also 'virtual '.real in effect but not in fact. The naturalistic philosophical framework for virtual reality developed by Metzinger and by Revonsuo is discussed and critiqued. An alternative monadological realism is proposed and comparisons are made with Leibniz and Bohm.
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