Android epistemology for babies: Relections on words, thoughts and theories
Synthese 122 (1-2):53-68 (2000)
| Abstract | Words, Thoughts and Theories arguesthat infants and children discover the physical and psychological featuresof the world by a process akin to scientific inquiry, more or less asconceived by philosophers of science in the 1960s (the theory theory).This essay discusses some of the philosophical background to analternative, more popular, ``modular'''' or ``maturational'''' account ofdevelopment, dismisses an array of philosophical objections to the theorytheory, suggests that the theory theory offers an undeveloped project forartificial intelligence, and, relying on recent psychological work oncausation, offers suggestions about how principles of causal inference mayprovide a developmental solution to the ``frame problem''''. | |||||||||
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Ron Amundson (1983). The Epistemological Status of a Naturalized Epistemology. Inquiry 26 (3):333 – 344.
Scott Hendricks (2006). The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Semantics, Moral. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
Kenneth R. Livingston (1993). What Fodor Means: Some Thoughts on Reading Jerry Fodor's A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):289-301.
Christopher Gauker (1992). The Lockean Theory of Communication. Noûs 26 (3):303-324.
Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Causal Theories of Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
C. Glymour (2000). Android Epistemology for Babies. Synthese 122 (1-2):53-68.
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