David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 65 (3):448-471 (1998)
Standard models of statistical explanation face two intractable difficulties. In his 1984 Salmon argues that because statistical explanations are essentially probabilistic we can make sense of statistical explanation only by rejecting the intuition that scientific explanations are contrastive. Further, frequently the point of a statistical explanation is to identify the etiology of its explanandum, but on standard models probabilistic explanations often fail to do so. This paper offers an alternative conception of statistical explanations on which explanations of the frequency of a property consist in the derivation of that frequency from a statistical specification of the mechanism by which instances of the relevant property are produced. Such explanations are contrastive precisely because they identify the determinate causal etiologies of their explananda
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kareem Khalifa (2011). Contrastive Explanations as Social Accounts. Social Epistemology 24 (4):263-284.
Jaakko Kuorikoski (2012). Contrastive Statistical Explanation and Causal Heterogeneity. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):435-452.
Similar books and articles
Arno G. Wouters (2007). Design Explanation: Determining the Constraints on What Can Be Alive. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 67 (1):65-80.
Caterina Marchionni (2006). Contrastive Explanation and Unrealistic Models: The Case of the New Economic Geography. Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (4):425-446.
Michael Strevens (2000). Do Large Probabilities Explain Better? Philosophy of Science 67 (3):366-390.
Gurol Irzik & Eric Meyer (1987). Causal Modeling: New Directions for Statistical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 54 (4):495-514.
Carl G. Hempel (1968). Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation. Philosophy of Science 35 (2):116-133.
Wesley C. Salmon (1974). Comments on 'Hempel's Ambiguity' by J. Alberto Coffa. Synthese 28 (2):165 - 169.
Lawrence Sklar (1973). Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):194-212.
Henrik Hållsten (1999). Deductive Chauvinism. Synthese 120 (1):49-59.
James H. Fetzer (1972). Statistical Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:337 - 347.
Lorenz Kruger (1976). Are Statistical Explanations Possible? Philosophy of Science 43 (1):129-146.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #155,308 of 1,098,412 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,417 of 1,098,412 )
How can I increase my downloads?