The hierarchies of knowledge and the mathematics of discovery

Minds and Machines 1 (1):75-95 (1991)
Rather than attempting to characterize a relation of confirmation between evidence and theory, epistemology might better consider which methods of forming conjectures from evidence, or of altering beliefs in the light of evidence, are most reliable for getting to the truth. A logical framework for such a study was constructed in the early 1960s by E. Mark Gold and Hilary Putnam. This essay describes some of the results that have been obtained in that framework and their significance for philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and for normative epistemology when truth is relative.
Keywords Learning  induction  logic  relativism  epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/BF00360580
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