David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (5):529-539 (2000)
Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises whether the usual modeltheoretic sense of validity and Tarski's 1936 sense are the same. I argue in this paper that they probably are not, and that the proof Tarski had in mind, although unusable to prove that model-theoretically valid arguments are truth-preserving, can be used to prove that arguments valid in Tarski's 1936 sense are truth-preserving
|Keywords||logical consequence validity form Tarski|
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred Tarski (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Scott Soames (1998). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.
John Etchemendy (1990). The Concept of Logical Consequence. Harvard University Press.
Gila Sher (1996). Did Tarski Commit "Tarski's Fallacy"? Journal of Symbolic Logic 61 (2):653-686.
Citations of this work BETA
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2011). The Different Ways in Which Logic is (Said to Be) Formal. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):303 - 332.
William H. Hanson (2006). Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437 - 459.
Mario Gómez-Torrente (2009). Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):249-297.
William H. Hanson (2006). Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437-459.
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