Two problems for an epistemicist view of vagueness

Philosophical Issues 8:237-245 (1997)
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Abstract

This paper presents some difficulties for Timothy Williamson's epistemicist view of vagueness and for an argument he gives in its defense. First, I claim that the argument, which uses the notion of an "omniscient speaker", is question-begging. Next, I argue that some presumably true scientific hypotheses, which postulate certain relations between everyday vague predicates and scientific predicates, make the central theses of epistemicism highly implausible. Finally, I show that the "margin for error principles" used by Williamson to explain away the kind of ignorance conjectured by epistemicism lead to new sorites-like arguments with unacceptable conclusions.

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Mario Gomez-Torrente
National Autonomous University of Mexico

Citations of this work

Higher-Order Sorites Paradox.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
The impossibility of vagueness.Kit Fine - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Vagueness and Margin for error principles.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
An anti-epistemicist consequence of Margin for error semantics for knowledge.Delia Graff Fara - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):127-142.

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