Two problems for an epistemicist view of vagueness

Philosophical Issues 8:237-245 (1997)
This paper presents some difficulties for Timothy Williamson's epistemicist view of vagueness and for an argument he gives in its defense. First, I claim that the argument, which uses the notion of an "omniscient speaker", is question-begging. Next, I argue that some presumably true scientific hypotheses, which postulate certain relations between everyday vague predicates and scientific predicates, make the central theses of epistemicism highly implausible. Finally, I show that the "margin for error principles" used by Williamson to explain away the kind of ignorance conjectured by epistemicism lead to new sorites-like arguments with unacceptable conclusions.
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DOI 10.2307/1523008
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Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
Kit Fine (2008). The Impossibility of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Elia Zardini (2013). Luminosity and Determinacy. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.

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