Minds and Machines 19 (2):151-180 (2009)
|Abstract||Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise. In particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point. However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is holistic or analytic. Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses. In this paper, we show how, with some additions, a recent theory of expert memory (the template theory) offers a coherent and wide-ranging explanation of intuition in expert behaviour. It is shown that the theory accounts for the key features of intuition: it explains the rapid onset of intuition and its perceptual nature, provides mechanisms for learning, incorporates processes showing how perception is linked to action and emotion, and how experts capture the entirety of a situation. In doing so, the new theory addresses the issues problematic for Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories. Implications for research and practice are discussed.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Fernand Gobet (2012). Concepts Without Intuition Lose the Game: Commentary on Montero and Evans (2011). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):237-250.
George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.
John Symons (2008). Intuition and Philosophical Methodology. Axiomathes 18 (1).
Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.
George Bealer (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In Rethinking Intuition.
Jeffrey Hanson (2009). Michel Henry's Critique of the Limits of Intuition. Studia Phaenomenologica 9:97-111.
Pessi Lyyra (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #29,866 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?