David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 43 (3):450-489 (2009)
On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and so allows for the possibility of genuine normative conflicts.
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References found in this work BETA
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press.
Brian F. Chellas (1980). Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
John Francis Horty (2001). Agency and Deontic Logic. Oxford University Press.
Michael J. Zimmerman (1996). The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Shyam Nair (2016). Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought's. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):629-663.
Justin Snedegar (2015). Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought. Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.
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