Normative conflicts and the logic of 'ought'

Noûs 43 (3):450-489 (2009)
On the face of it, normative conflicts are commonplace. Yet standard deontic logic declares them to be logically impossible. That prompts the question, What are the proper principles of normative reasoning if such conflicts are possible? This paper examines several alternatives that have been proposed for a logic of 'ought' that can accommodate normative conflicts, and finds all of them unsatisfactory as measured against three criteria of adequacy. It then introduces a new logic that does meet all three criteria, and so allows for the possibility of genuine normative conflicts.
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References found in this work BETA
David O. Brink (1994). Moral Conflict and its Structure. Philosophical Review 103 (2):215-247.
Earl Conee (1982). Against Moral Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 91 (1):87-97.

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