|Abstract||Causal pluralism is the view that causation is not a single kind of relation or connection between things in the world. Instead, the apparently simple and univocal term "cause" is seen as masking an underlying diversity. Assessing such a claim requires making sense of a difficult counting operation. How do we tell whether a theory of causation is identifying causation with a "single" kind of connection? In practice, there tends not to be much disagreement about how to do the counting, because most philosophical work on causation has sought a view with an obvious kind of unity. The literature often works with a standard range of candidate connections that seem to have an important link to the idea of causation. These include natural laws, de facto regularities, counterfactual dependence, probabilistic dependence, and some others. It has been common in philosophy to pick one of these and try to make sense of causation entirely in those terms. The candidate chosen is seen as either fundamental to our thinking about the world, a fundamental ingredient of the world itself, or both. Against that background, it is an unorthodox move to say that all such unified 1 treatments of causation are mistaken; causation is, with respect to the ingredients recognized as distinct options in philosophical practice, irreducibly plural or diverse. Appropriately, causal pluralism comes in several kinds. The main focus of this survey is a collection of recent treatments that directly oppose the kind of unity seen in traditional analyses. The simplest kind of pluralism treats our ordinary talk of causation as shifting between two distinct "concepts" of cause (section 3). This view posits an ambiguity that could be resolved if each concept was given a different name. Another suggestion is that we have a single concept of causation, but one whose use is guided by what Brian Skyrms called an "amiable jumble" of criteria that sometimes work together and sometimes pull apart (section 4). Those two options use traditional philosophical raw materials to make sense of causation (regularities, counterfactuals, etc.) but put them to work in unorthodox ways..|
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