Mind and Language 18 (3):266-272 (2003)
|Abstract||My commentary on Hurley is concerned with foundational issues. Hurley's investigation of animal cognition is cast within a particular framework—basically, a philosophically refined version of folk psychology. Her discussion has a complicated relationship to unresolved debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, especially debates about the extent to which folk psychological categories are aimed at picking out features of the causal organization of the mind.|
|Keywords||Action Animal Folk Psychology Metaphysics Mind Hurley, S|
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