Model-based science and the representational theory of mind
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Over the past 30 years, one topic much discussed in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology has been the status of "the representational theory of mind," or "RTM." As usually conceived, the representational theory holds that the mind operates (in part) by creating, storing, and using internal representations of objects and events in the world
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
Eduard Marbach (1996). Understanding the Representational Mind: A Phenomenological Perspective. [REVIEW] Human Studies 19 (2):137-52.
Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
Stuart Silvers (1989). Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):463-473.
Michael Tye (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.
Demetris Portides (2011). Seeking Representations of Phenomena: Phenomenological Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):334-341.
Josh Weisberg (2003). Being All That We Can Be: A Critical Review of Thomas Metzinger's Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):89-96.
Grant R. Gillett (1989). Representations and Cognitive Science. Inquiry 32 (September):261-77.
Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #271,070 of 1,096,445 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?