Rethinking the debriefing paradigm: The rationality of belief perseverance

Logos and Episteme 3 (1):51-74 (2012)
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Abstract

By examining particular cases of belief perseverance following the undermining of their original evidentiary grounds, this paper considers two theories of rational belief revision: foundation and coherence. Gilbert Harman has argued for coherence over foundationalism on the grounds that the foundations theory absurdly deems most of our beliefs to be not rationally held. A consequence of the unacceptability of foundationalism is that belief perseverance is rational. This paper defends the intuitive judgement that belief perseverance is irrational by offering a competing explanation of what goes on in cases like the debriefing paradigm which does not rely upon foundationalist principles but instead shows that such cases are properly viewed as instances of positive undermining of the sort described by the coherence theory.

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David Godden
Michigan State University

Citations of this work

Adversariality and Argumentation.John Casey - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (1):77-108.
Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition.David Godden - 2016 - In Fabio Paglieri, Laura Bonelli & Silvia Felletti (eds.), The psychology of argument: Cognitive approaches to argumentation and persuasion. London: College Publications. pp. 67-83.

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