Recurrent transient underdetermination and the glass half full
Philosophical Studies 137 (1):141 - 148 (2008)
| Abstract | Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesWard E. Jones (2000). Underdetermination and the Explanation of Theory-Acceptance: A Response to Samir Okasha. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):299 – 304.
Ian McDiarmid (2008). Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference? Erkenntnis 69 (3):279 - 293.
Wolfgang Pietsch, Defending Underdetermination or Why the Historical Perspective Makes a Difference.
John D. Norton (forthcoming). Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory. The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice:17--44.
Samir Okasha (2002). Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):303-319.
P. Kyle Stanford (2001). Refusing the Devil's Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously? Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S1-.
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