Philosophical Studies 137 (1):141 - 148 (2008)
|Abstract||Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.|
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