Recurrent transient underdetermination and the glass half full [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):141 - 148 (2008)
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
Keywords Theory  Evidence  Scientific realism  Underdetermination  Approximate truth
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DOI 10.2307/40208786
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Oddie, Truthlikeness. Stanford Encyclopedia.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moti Mizrahi (forthcoming). Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-10.
Michael Devitt (2011). Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):285-293.
Daniel Stoljar (2013). Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):745-752.

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