Triviality arguments against functionalism

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295 (2009)
Abstract
“Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
Keywords Functionalism  Mind  Computation  Realization  Causal role
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and Behaviorism. Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
Carol E. Cleland (2002). On Effective Procedures. Minds and Machines 12 (2):159-179.

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