David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):588-603 (2013)
Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond
|Keywords||Joint action shared emotion social motivation|
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References found in this work BETA
Margaret Gilbert (1989). On Social Facts. Routledge.
Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll (2005). Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
Natalie Sebanz, Harold Bekkering & Günther Knoblich (2006). Joint Action: Bodies and Minds Moving Together. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):70-76.
Michael E. Bratman (1993). Shared Intention. Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
Citations of this work BETA
Vivian Bohl (2015). We Read Minds to Shape Relationships. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):674-694.
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