David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):195-211 (1997)
In this paper, I develop a noncausal view of agency. I defend the thesis that choices are uncaused mental actions and maintain, contrary to causal theorists of action, that choices differ intrinsically or inherently from nonactions. I explain how they do by placing them in an ontology favored by causal agency theorists (agent-causationists). This ontology is one of powers and liabilities.After explicating how a choice is an uncaused event, I explain how an adequate account of freedom involves the concept of choosing for a reason. Choosing for a reason is a teleological notion, and I set forth what is involved in making a choice for a purpose
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Mark Balaguer (2002). A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will. Noûs 36 (3):379-406.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
John Lemos (2011). Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will. Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307–330.
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