Stumping For Widerker

Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):83-89 (1999)
David Widerker has forcefully argued that a libertarian is on firm ground in believing that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is true. Eleonore Stump has argued that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and that its acceptance is not required for a rejection of compatibilism.This paper is a defense of Widerker against Stump. I argue that it is not at all clear that Stump’s view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that she has not provided a good reason for thinking that a libertarian can abandon PAP
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil19991619
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