David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101 (2001)
Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires the freedom to act otherwise
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Stewart Goetz (2001). Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.
Seth Shabo (2007). Flickers of Freedom and Modes of Action: A Reply to Timpe. Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.
Eleonore Stump (1999). Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 3 (4):299-324.
Stewart Goetz (1999). Stumping For Widerker. Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):83-89.
Eleonore Stump (1996). Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. 73-88.
Kevin Timpe (2006). A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism. Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.
Derk Pereboom (2003). Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 184--199.
Kevin Timpe (2009). Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):77-91.
Richard M. Glatz (2008). The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257 - 272.
Jeremy Byrd (2010). Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Soft Libertarianism and Flickers of Freedom. In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. 251--264.
Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
Eleonore Stump (1999). Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt. Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):413-422.
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Chisholm on Freedom. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):630-648.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads1 ( #424,306 of 1,096,853 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #273,368 of 1,096,853 )
How can I increase my downloads?