Stump on libertarianism and the principle of alternative possibilities

Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101 (2001)
Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of libertarian freedom must maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental action and that such moral responsibility is incompatible with that mental action’s being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires the freedom to act otherwise
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil200118115
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