David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others’ decisions.
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Frank Riedel & Linda Sass (2014). Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision 76 (4):469-509.
Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent (2012). The Puzzle of Cooperation in a Game of Chicken: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 72 (1):65-87.
Vitaly Pruzhansky (2013). Maximin Play in Completely Mixed Strategic Games. Theory and Decision 75 (4):543-561.
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