Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others’ decisions.
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Frank Riedel & Linda Sass (2014). Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision 76 (4):469-509.

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