A non-eliminative understanding of austere nominalism

European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54 (2008)
How do we account for resemblance between concrete particular objects? What is it about reality which makes a sentence such as the following true? (1) x and y are both spherical Realists about properties claim that, at a fundamental level, this sentence is true because x and y both exemplify the property of sphericity. Michael Loux favours this account of resemblance. Nevertheless, Loux concedes that austere nominalism, which I understand to be the view that nothing exists over and above particular concrete objects, can offer a plausible account of resemblance.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00250.x
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D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.

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