European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):43–54 (2008)
|Abstract||How do we account for resemblance between concrete particular objects? What is it about reality which makes a sentence such as the following true? (1) x and y are both spherical Realists about properties claim that, at a fundamental level, this sentence is true because x and y both exemplify the property of sphericity. Michael Loux favours this account of resemblance. Nevertheless, Loux concedes that austere nominalism, which I understand to be the view that nothing exists over and above particular concrete objects, can offer a plausible account of resemblance.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965 - 982.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999). Resemblance Nominalism and the Imperfect Community. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):965-982.
David Manley (2002). Properties and Resemblance Classes. Noûs 36 (1):75–96.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism. Oxford University Press.
Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Clarendon Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford University Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004). Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):644 – 651.
Alexander Bird (2003). Resemblance Nominalism and Counterparts. Analysis 63 (3):221–228.
Robert K. Shope (1979). Eliminating Mistakes About Eliminative Materialism. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):590-612.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #20,554 of 549,128 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,128 )
How can I increase my downloads?