Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies

Abstract
Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost.
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PhilPapers Archive Philip Goff, Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. 71--125.

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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Janzen (2012). Physicalists Have Nothing to Fear From Ghosts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):91-104.
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