David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):237-253 (2012)
Recent work on Hume's Theory of Perception has shown that Hume takes the appearance of impressions to vary according to the ideas under which they are subsumed. In this paper, I argue that the vulgar position in the section where he discusses the Inference from Constancy is characterised by an ideal primordial state of mind where impressions are directly encountered without being subsumed under any idea. In particular, impressions which are not subsumed under the idea of a perception do not appear to the mind as impressions. Read in this light, Hume's Inference from Constancy is immune to the difficulties which have commonly been raised against it
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References found in this work BETA
Donald L. M. Baxter (2001). Hume on Steadfast Objects and Time. Hume Studies 27 (1):129-148.
Mark Collier (1999). Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects&Quot;. Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170.
Don Garrett (1997). Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
H. H. Price (1981). Hume's Theory of the External World. Greenwood Press.
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