An admissible semantics for propositionally quantified relevant logics

Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):73 - 100 (2010)
The Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logics is extended to give a sound and complete model theory for many propositionally quantified relevant logics (and some non-relevant ones). This involves a restriction on which sets of worlds are admissible as propositions, and an interpretation of propositional quantification that makes ∀ pA true when there is some true admissible proposition that entails all p -instantiations of A . It is also shown that without the admissibility qualification many of the systems considered are semantically incomplete, including all those that are sub-logics of the quantified version of Anderson and Belnap’s system E of entailment, extended by the mingle axiom and the Ackermann constant t . The incompleteness proof involves an algebraic semantics based on atomless complete Boolean algebras.
Keywords Propositional quantifiers  Relevant logic  Admissible proposition  Propositional function  Incompleteness  Atomless Boolean algebra
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DOI 10.2307/20685127
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Leon Henkin (1950). Completeness in the Theory of Types. Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):81-91.

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