Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification

Nos 41 (2):178�203 (2007)
Abstract
Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
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    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Audi (1986). Belief, Reason, and Inference. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):27-65.
    Robert Audi (1988). Justification, Truth, and Reliability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):1-29.
    Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
    Paul A. Boghossian (1992). Reply to Schiffer. Philosophical Issues 2:39-42.

    View all 25 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Mikkel Gerken (2011). Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
    Sanford Goldberg (2010). The Metasemantics of Memory. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):95-107.
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