Anti-Individualism, Content Preservation, and Discursive Justification

Noûs 41 (2):178-203 (2007)
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Abstract

Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification

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Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
Content externalism and brute logical error.John M. Collins - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 549-574.

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References found in this work

Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Content and self-knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.
The structure of justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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