David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33 (2002)
Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. Given this theory,emotions are feelings in some important sense of "feelings", and these feelings are identified as particular emotions by reference to their hedonic character and the cognitive state that causes the hedonic feelings.
|Keywords||*Cognition *Emotions *Hedonism *Perception *Theories Fear Pleasure|
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Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions as Attitudes. Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi (2015). Emotions and Wellbeing. Topoi 34 (2):461-474.
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