Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority

Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76 (2002)
Abstract
In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about
Keywords Authority  Behavior  Belief  Epistemology  Linguistics
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