Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability1

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301-314 (2006)
In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such.
Keywords Achievement  Discriminability  Epistemology  Individualism  Self-knowledge  Brown, Jessica
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.

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