Correspondence

Abstract
Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief
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