David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):711 – 730 (2007)
Internalists hold that all reasons derive from existing motivations. They also hold that agents act irrationally when they fail to act on the strongest reasons they have. Emotions can make one act irrationally. But depression as an emotion tends to remove the motivation to act at the same time as it causes irrational inaction. If depression can cause irrationality, then the reasons to act must remain. Hence the internalist must explain how reasons can remain if depression removes motivation. This paper does so by arguing that the cognitive, evaluative aspect of motivation remains when the dispositional and affective aspects are removed.
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References found in this work BETA
Paul E. Griffiths (1997). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. University of Chicago Press.
Timothy Schroeder (2004). Three Faces of Desire. Oxford University Press.
Robert C. Solomon (1976/1983). The Passions. University of Notre Dame Press.
Nomy Arpaly (2000). On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment. Ethics 110 (3):488-513.
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