Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79 (2000)
A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Externalism  Incompatibilism  Knowledge  Memory  Thought
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DOI 10.1023/A:1018642507178
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