Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79 (2000)
|Abstract||A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one|
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Externalism Incompatibilism Knowledge Memory Thought|
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