E Pluribus Unum: Arguments against Conceptual Schemes and Empirical Content

Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):411-438 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The idea that there are conceptual schemes, relative to which we conceptualize experience, and empirical content, the “raw” data of experience that get conceptualized through our conceptual schemes into beliefs or sentences, is not new. The idea that there are neither conceptual schemes nor empirical content, however, is. Moreover, it is so new, that only four arguments have so far been given against this dualism, with Donald Davidson himself presenting versions of all four. In this paper, I show that in both the general and Davidson’s specific form the first three arguments against scheme-content dualism rely on the fourth. From many there is just one. Then I show that the fate of the first three arguments against scheme-content dualism hangs on that of the fourth. Finally I present four reasons why the fourth argument fails. For the sake of the dualism’s detractors, therefore, one can only hope that forthcoming arguments against scheme-content dualism fare better than those given so far.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Alternative Conceptual Schemes and A Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism.Xinli Wang - 2012 reprint - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:267-275.
Why conceptual schemes?Maria Baghramian - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (3):287–306.
Is davidson’s epistemology coherent?Douglas James MacDermid - 2004 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):101-130.
From an analysis of the notion of organization to limits on conceptual diversity.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2013 - Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):86-94.
The Relativist Challenge to Comparative Philosophy.Ewing Chinn - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):451-466.
Three models of conceptual schemes.Michael P. Lynch - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):407 – 426.
Externalizing content.Matjaž Potrć - 1989 - In Johannes L. Brandl & Wolfgang L. Gomobcz (eds.), Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 179-191.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-14

Downloads
252 (#73,435)

6 months
8 (#157,827)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nathaniel Goldberg
Washington and Lee University

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 54 references / Add more references