David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 73 (1):109 - 144 (1987)
A conception of social epistemology is articulated with links to studies of science and opinion in such disciplines as history, sociology, and political science. The conception is evaluative, though, rather than purely descriptive. Three types of evaluative approaches are examined but rejected: relativism, consensualism, and expertism. A fourth, truth-linked, approach to intellectual evaluation is then advocated: social procedures should be appraised by their propensity to foster true belief. Standards of evaluation in social epistemics would be much the same as those in individual epistemics, only the objects of evaluation would be interpersonal patterns of judgment and communication, and institutional practices that bear on opinion formation.
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References found in this work BETA
Barry Barnes (1977). Interests and the Growth of Knowledge. Routledge and K. Paul.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals. Episteme 4 (1):66-92.
Marc Moffett (2007). Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry. Episteme 4 (3):352-367.
Alvin I. Goldman (1994). Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.
Alexander Bird (2010). Social Knowing: The Social Sense of 'Scientific Knowledge'. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):23-56.
David L. Hull (1992). An Evolutionary Account of Science: A Response to Rosenberg's Critical Notice. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):229-236.
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