Fibonacci, Yablo, and the cassationist approach to paradox

Mind 115 (460):867-890 (2006)
A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here revives the mediaeval cassatio approach, one that largely disappeared due to its incomprehending rejection by influential contemporary writers such as William Shyreswood and Thomas Bradwardine. The diagnosis readily extends to the set-theoretic paradoxes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl867
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Ian Rumfitt (2014). I—Truth and Meaning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.
Laurence Goldstein (2009). A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):377 - 389.
Gary Kemp (2014). II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

48 ( #69,855 of 1,725,168 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

27 ( #36,487 of 1,725,168 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.