Hedonic pluralism

Philosophical Studies 48 (1):49 - 55 (1985)
Abstract
Hedonic pluralism is the thesis that 'pleasure' cannot be given a single, all-embracing definition. In this paper I criticize the reasoning people use to support this thesis and suggest some plausible all-encompassing analyses that easily avoid the kinds of objections people raise to all-encompassing analyses.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
    Fred Feldman (2002). The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.
    Aaron Smuts (2011). The Feels Good Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.
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