Graduate studies at Western
The Monist 88 (1):3-10 (2005)
|Abstract||This paper builds on work done by Graham Priest (1994, 1995, 1998b, 2000) but does not presuppose knowledge of that work. Priest established that many paradoxes, which had been traditionally divided into different families, have a structure in common – which he calls the Inclosure Schema – and, correlatively, that these paradoxes demand a uniform solution. The uniform solution favoured by Priest is a Dialetheist one. I show that, with minor modification, the Inclosure Schema becomes sufficiently embracing to exhibit the underlying structure not just of the logico-semantical paradoxes discussed by Priest, but of some metaphysical paradoxes too. The uniform solution advocated here is a non-Dialetheist one. Although this is not the concern of the present paper, I am persuaded by some recent work (Bromand 2002; Simmons 1993, pp.80-2) that Dialetheism, whatever its other virtues, does not deliver a solution to the semantical paradoxes.|
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