Is less knowledge better than more?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):751-752 (2000)
| Abstract | When a distinction is drawn between “total” knowledge and “problem-specific” knowledge, it is seen that successful users of the recognition heuristic have more problem-specific knowledge than people unable to exploit this heuristic. So it is not ignorance that makes them smart, but knowledge. | |||||||||
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Douglas Walton (2006). Rules for Reasoning From Knowledge and Lack of Knowledge. Philosophia 34 (3):355-376.
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John Hyman (1999). How Knowledge Works. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (197):433-451.
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Pierre le Morvan (2011). Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief. Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
Klemens Kappel (2010). Expressivism About Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):175-194.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
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