David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 14 (1):1 - 16 (2010)
The answer to the title question is “No.” The first section argues, using the example of Huckleberry Finn, that rational agents need not be motivated by their explicit judgments of rightness and wrongness. Section II rejects a plausible argument to the conclusion that rational agents must have some moral concerns. The third section clarifies the relevant concept of irrationality and argues that moral incoherence does not equate with this common relevant concept. Section IV questions a rational requirement for prudential concern and whether a requirement for moral concern would follow from it. Section V examines the rationality of amoralists and partial amoralists, and Sect. VI closes with speculation on why there might seem to be a rational requirement to be morally motivated.
|Keywords||Emotions Huckleberry Finn Moral concern Rationality|
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References found in this work BETA
Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
Jonathan Bennett (1974). The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn. Philosophy 49 (188):123-134.
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Philippa Foot (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
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