Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62 (1994)
|Abstract||Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.|
|Keywords||Causation Epistemology Experience Functionalism Mental States|
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