Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted

Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Experience  Functionalism  Mental States
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DOI 10.1080/00048409412345871
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PhilPapers Archive Irwin Goldstein, Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted
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