Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states

Philosophy 75 (291):89-104 (2000)
Abstract
By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of mental states in this way.
Keywords Mental States  Metaphysics  Pain  Pleasure  Subjectivity  Intersubjectivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Irwin Goldstein, Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
John D. Greenwood (2007). Unnatural Epistemology. Mind and Language 22 (2):132-149.
Similar books and articles
Colin McGinn (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.
Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 33-56.
Murat Aydede (2000). An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.
Justin Klocksiem (2010). Pleasure, Desire, and Oppositeness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
R. Philip Buckley (2001). Physicalism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):155-174.
Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.
Kurt Baier (1962). Smart on Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):57-68.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

119 ( #9,158 of 1,101,857 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

23 ( #8,815 of 1,101,857 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.