David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob implies that bi-level simulationism creates an unbridgeable ‘gap’ in intention reading, but this is not a compelling challenge.
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Citations of this work BETA
Pierre Jacob (2009). The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
Pierre Jacob (2009). A Philosopher's Reflections on the Discovery of Mirror Neurons. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (3):570-595.
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