David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):505-528 (2014)
This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps
|Keywords||Kant Conceptualism Non-Conceptualism Nonconceptualism Intuition Unity Magnitude Perception Concept|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Martin Heidegger (1967). Being and Time. Oxford, Blackwell.
Martin Heidegger (1962). Being and Time. London, Scm Press.
Henry E. Allison (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Yale University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Lara Ostaric (2009). Kant's Account of Nature's Systematicity and the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Inquiry 52 (2):155 – 178.
Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
Susan Neiman (1994). The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant. Oxford University Press.
Manuel Liz (2006). Camouflaged Physical Objects. Theoria 21 (2):165-184.
Jeff Malpas (1999). Constituting the Mind: Kant, Davidson, and the Unity of Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1):1-30.
Garrath Williams (1999). Nietzsche's Response to Kant's Morality. Philosophical Forum 30 (3):201–216.
Phillip L. Quinn (1990). Saving Faith From Kant's Remarkable Antimony. Faith and Philosophy 7 (4):418-433.
Clark Zumbach (1981). Kant's Argument for the Autonomy of Biology. Nature and System 3:67 - 79.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt. In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer
Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.
Nicholas Rescher (1999). Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant's Theory of Rational Systematization. Cambridge University Press.
Christopher Ward (2002). Spinozism and Kant's Transcendental Ideal. Idealistic Studies 32 (3):221-236.
Added to index2011-12-29
Total downloads301 ( #8,484 of 1,932,461 )
Recent downloads (6 months)74 ( #3,843 of 1,932,461 )
How can I increase my downloads?