Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities

In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 261-273 (2004)
Abstract
Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing philosophical orthodoxy, I show there are no posteriori identities -- identities that cannot be known of a priori.
Keywords materialism  identity  dualism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    Marc A. Moffett (2010). Against a Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 83-106.
    Robert M. Anderson (1974). The Illusions of Experience. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974:549 - 561.
    István Aranyosi (2003). Physical Constituents of Qualia. Philosophical Studies 116 (2):103-131.
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 307--318.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    113 ( #7,056 of 1,088,784 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    5 ( #20,069 of 1,088,784 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.