Pleasure and pain: Unconditional intrinsic values

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276 (1989)
Abstract
That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa Foot, R M Hare, Gilbert Harman, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the many philosophers addressed.
Keywords Axiology  Intrinsic Value  Pain  Pleasure
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    Fred Feldman (2002). The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.
    Attila Tanyi (2011). Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.
    Chris Heathwood (2005). The Problem of Defective Desires. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):487 – 504.
    Greg Janzen (2013). An Adverbialist–Objectualist Account of Pain. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):859-876.
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