Philosophical intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status

Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26 (2007)
Abstract
Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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Helen De Cruz (2015). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.

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