|Abstract||A debate is raging over philosophical methodology. It is a debate between philosophical traditionalists and science-oriented philosophical naturalists concerning the legitimacy of the widespread use of intuitions in philosophy. Not everyone finds the term ‘intuition’ the best label for what philosophers rely upon in the relevant sector of their practice. Instead of “intuitions” some prefer to talk of intuitive judgments, thought experiments, or what have you. Nonetheless, “intuition” is the most commonly used term in the territory, so I shall not abandon it, though other terms will be used as well. Described fairly neutrally, the philosophical activity in question consists of specifying a hypothetical scenario and rendering an intuitive judgment about the correctness or incorrectness of classifying it under a stipulated heading. Does a given predicate ‘F’ apply to an event, an individual, a pair of objects, etc. in the scenario? Putting the question less linguistically, is a certain property or relation exemplified in the scenario? The central question in the debate is whether, when intuitions or intuitive judgments are formed about such cases, they provide good evidence for some type of philosophical conclusion. For instance, are they good evidence for a conclusion of the form “Case C is/is not an instance of F”? Philosophers’ ultimate interest is not in cases per se. Cases are examined as a means to determining the content or composition of the referent of ‘F’ (where the referent may be a property, a kind, a meaning, or a concept). But this further determination is not in the foreground -- though it definitely cannot be ignored|
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