Précis of "Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading"

Philosophical Studies 144 (3):431 - 434 (2009)
This article focuses on, and critiques, Goldman's view that third-person mind-reading is grounded in first-person introspection. It argues, on the contrary, that first-person awareness of propositional attitude events is always interpretative, resulting from us turning our mind-reading abilities upon ourselves
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.

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