Paradoxical partners: semantical brides and set-theoretical grooms

Analysis 73 (1):33-37 (2013)
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Abstract

Is there a key for ‘translating' some set-theoretical paradoxes into counterpart semantical paradoxes and vice-versa? There is, and this encourages the hope of a unified solution. The solution turns not on inventing new axioms that do not entail contradiction, but on imposing a completely intuitive restriction on the comprehension axiom of naive set theory in order to avoid illegitimate (circular) stipulation

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2012-11-14

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Author's Profile

Laurence Goldstein
PhD: University of St. Andrews; Last affiliation: University of Kent

References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Epimenides and Curry.Laurence Goldstein - 1986 - Analysis 46 (3):117 - 121.

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