Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence

In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman and Littlefield (1998)
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Jennifer Nagel (2007). Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.

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