Reliabilism in philosophy

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117 (2009)
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
Keywords Reliabilism  Disagreement  Philosophical methodology
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DOI 10.2307/27734355
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